



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

WORLD-POLITICS.

LONDON: BERLIN: PARIS: WASHINGTON.

LONDON, *September, 1904.*

SINCE Mr. Chamberlain, sixteen months ago, launched his Fiscal programme there have been twenty-three contested by-elections, and one uncontested. Of these twenty-four seats, seven only were held by the Liberals in May, 1903. To-day the position is almost precisely reversed. The Liberals now hold sixteen of the seats and the Tories eight. They have captured nine constituencies out of hand, and they have very considerably increased their majorities in the seats that were already theirs when Mr. Chamberlain turned his batteries on Free Trade. Altogether, the Liberal vote during the last sixteen months' campaigning has increased by nearly 30,000, while the Tory and Protectionist vote has remained little more than stationary, its total growth amounting to less than 1200. A year and more of heated Tariff controversy has taught Englishmen to suspect all figures, but there can, I think, be no mistaking the drift of these. The movement of events points with unescapable precision to a Liberal victory at the next General Election. There are some things even in politics, of which one can foresee the issue, though the manner and the time of their coming may be still uncertain; and this is one of them.

Whether Mr. Balfour dissolves Parliament or merely resigns; whether his self-destroying dexterity as a strategist—for it is rather as a House of Commons strategist than as a statesman that people now think of Mr. Balfour—will suffice to carry him on to 1906; or whether his pursuers will succeed in cornering him in the coming year, all this is at present unpredictable. But, whenever and however the battle is joined, its result is already taken for granted. The rashest Protectionist of them all is not so rash as to maintain any longer, even in public, that an election fought

out primarily on the Free Trade issue and secondly on the Education Bill, which has restored political Non-conformity to life, on the Chinese Labor question, which has jarred on the moral sense of the country to a degree perhaps hardly warranted by the facts, and on the Licensing Bill, which the public at large looks upon as little less than the free gift of a national asset to the brewers, can end in anything but a Liberal victory. Mr. Chamberlain himself, whose sanguine, speculative temperament makes him the last man to admit an unpleasant fact, has admitted this; and his followers are now repeating it, as though it were the most natural thing in the world and as though all along they had never expected anything else. It is true they keep up a show of confidence; and with politicians on the brink of visible and immediate defeat, confidence always and necessarily takes the form of prophecies. If they agree, having no choice in the matter, to forego the present, they can at least claim the future as their own. This is what the Protectionists are now doing. I am never in their company without being assured that this is not a question to be settled by a single campaign, that "the big fight" will go on in spite of an initial set-back, and that the real battle, the real concentration of all the Protectionist forces, will take place at the election after next. Well, I have seen enough of politics to distrust any prophecies that are based on the election after next.

The Protectionist assumption, to which Mr. Chamberlain has given the frankest publicity, is that, as the upshot of the first appeal to the country, the Liberals will come into power; that their majority will be a small one and dependent upon the Irish vote; that the Home Rule question, the Education question—in which, it must be remembered, the Non-conformists, who are still the backbone of English Liberalism, take essentially opposite views to the Irish Catholics,—the weakness of Liberal policy in Foreign and Imperial issues, and the personal dissensions among the Liberal leaders will quickly bring the Government to the ground in confusion and ruin, and that a second General Election will then result in a handsome Protectionist majority. That is the plan to which Mr. Chamberlain, not without a certain hasty desperation, has now pinned his faith. It is not, of course, to be taken as implying a cessation of his activities, but merely a change in their character and direction.

The furious frontal assault on the Free Trade position has con-

fessedly failed, and it is not likely that "the raging, tearing propaganda" that was convulsing the country a year ago will again be renewed with anything like its primal frenzy. Operations underground are now rather the order of the day, and Mr. Chamberlain, though he will from time to time address great public meetings, seems to have about made up his mind that he can most usefully promote his objects by perfecting and extending the Protectionist organization, and waiting for events to play into his hands. Waiting is an exercise as irksome to Mr. Chamberlain as to President Roosevelt, but to the problems of electioneering he applies himself with an American relish, an American grasp, and perhaps, too, with an American over-estimate of their importance. He has already captured the machinery of the Liberal-Unionist party; and, when the National Union of Conservative Associations meets in October, it will be found, I think, that his hand is not less firmly on the rudder of the Conservative vessel.

I must, however, again remind Americans that these opening successes, though perhaps indispensable to any final triumph, do not in themselves amount to much. The capture of the party organization is a very different thing from convincing the country. It is different even in America where the mechanism of politics is in the ascendant; it is still more different, and immensely less significant, in Great Britain, where there is nothing to correspond to the binding prerogatives and force of a National Convention, and where, in politics as in everything else, individualism is fiercely cultivated. Still, it means undeniably something that Mr. Chamberlain should have so successfully encountered the Free-Traders in his own party, should practically have driven them forth from its official councils, and should be in a position to dominate the organization of his Conservative allies. It may, perhaps, mean more than is generally foreseen. Last year the National Union of Conservative Associations was only held from siding openly with Mr. Chamberlain by the veiled threat of Mr. Balfour's resignation. There are those who think that this year it will undoubtedly go the whole distance, and that before October is out Mr. Balfour's submission to Mr. Chamberlain and to Mr. Chamberlain's policy will have been publicly made.

However that may be, it is clearly of the essence of Mr. Chamberlain's new plan to entrench himself as deeply as possible in the Unionist ranks, to seize, marshal and develop the fighting strength

of the party organizations, to lose the next election—since lose he must—by as narrow a defeat as the utmost ingenuity can contrive, to employ his matchless abilities in Opposition to discredit and paralyze the Liberal Ministry, and finally, when he has succeeded in all this, to ride into power on a wave, if not of Protectionist enthusiasm, at least of disgust with Liberals and Liberalism. But for my present purpose the most important item in this spacious programme is Mr. Chamberlain's acknowledgment that a Liberal victory at the next election is unavoidable. I quite agree with him. To all appearances, something like a national call awaits the Liberal Party. So generally is this felt to be the case that the Party's condition to meet the call, and the probable policy and personnel of its Government, are already matters of discussion only less eager than that which centres on the Fiscal Question itself.

It is close on ten years since the Liberals were last in power. One great achievement and one greater event marked their term of office between 1892 and 1895. The achievement was Sir William Harcourt's Budget of 1894; the event was Mr. Gladstone's retirement and Lord Rosebery's accession to the Premiership. I need now do no more than briefly recall how the resignation of Mr. Gladstone, the withdrawal of his commanding authority, proved a signal for something like revolt to the incongruous elements that always and everywhere compose the Party of Progress; how the Radical section resented the advent of a Peer to the leadership; how another and larger section felt deeply aggrieved that Sir William Harcourt's claims to the Premiership had been passed over; how a bitterly personal quarrel broke out between Lord Rosebery and Sir William; how Lord Rosebery's attempt to carry out a policy he had not framed with a Cabinet that was none of his choosing led in 1895 to a severe disaster at the polls; how the line he took on the Home Rule question—his announcement that it could never be granted until England, "the predominant partner," was convinced of its justice and expediency—alienated his Irish allies; and how the Armenian massacres and the divisions they provoked in the Liberal ranks, ill-health, weariness and disappointment ended in 1896 with Lord Rosebery's retirement from the party leadership.

From 1895, when the Unionists came into power with a majority of 150, to 1902, when the Peace of Vereeniging was signed, the Liberals were in the abyss. Mr. Morley and Sir William Har-

court withdrew from active politics, and the leadership of the party fell by a process of exhaustion on the shoulders of Earl Spencer in the House of Lords and of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in the House of Commons. The Boer War, while it drew Lord Rosebery, Mr. Morley and Sir William Harcourt from their seclusion, only emphasized and accentuated the seemingly hopeless divisions that separated them and their followers. The Rosebery group, small in numbers but weighty in intellect and influence, substantially approved the war and supported the Government in prosecuting it. But by far the larger portion of the Liberal Party, headed by Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, violently opposed and criticised not only the policy, or lack of policy, that led to the struggle, but the methods by which it was carried on. At the General Election of 1900, the country, as was to be expected, declared emphatically against them, and gave the Unionists a renewed lease of power with a majority of 130. At that moment, the bitterness of the average Englishman against the Liberals, and the bitterness among the Liberals themselves, reached their zenith.

I cannot say that since then the Liberal Party has been rehabilitated in the confidence of the country in any positive sense. Negatively, it has immensely profited by the blunders and inefficiency of the Government. The people are visibly turning to it less because they trust either its policy or its leaders than because they have learned wholly to distrust the present Ministry. Peace and the gradual disappearance of South Africa as an electioneering issue enormously eased the Liberal situation. The nation quickly made up its mind that full credit had been given the Government for its maintenance of British power in South Africa, and that henceforth it was to be judged solely by its domestic record.

They were still further helped by a long and exasperating succession of Unionist ineptitudes. The ghastly "revelations" that followed the conclusion of the war were alone enough to discredit any Government. The Buller affair, the Corn Tax, the Education Bill, Mr. Brodrick's Army scheme, the Whitaker-Wright business, and the Venezuelan mess fed the national resentment. There were times in 1902 when only the Irish votes saved the Government from defeat. Still more frequently there were times when a vigorous Opposition might have done enormous damage by leading the universal disgust inspired by some of the Ministerial acts.

As no such Opposition existed, the country had to take the work of chastisement into its own hands. At by-election after by-election, throughout 1902 and the first few months of 1903, it smote the Government hip and thigh, and in spite of its huge majority the position of the Ministry, even then, was weak, if not absolutely precarious. Its strength was the measure of the Opposition's weakness, and conversely the strength of the Opposition, such as it was, so far from being positive and inherent, was no more than the reflex action of the Ministry's weakness. Up to the moment when Mr. Chamberlain broke into Protection a real Liberal unity was as far off as ever; and though the Government was palpably losing ground, no Liberal even for a moment dreamed of the possibility of victory at the next election.

To-day, superficially at any rate, all that is changed. The Liberals are again a united party, united by the overriding necessity of defending Free Trade. That union, daily cemented afresh by the prospect, or rather certainty, of victory, is sufficient, I think, to carry the Liberals through the next election, and to enable them to form a Government. Is it, however, strong and pervasive enough to enable them to form and carry out a policy? One must remember that the safeguarding of Free Trade is purely defensive work, work that will be done, if at all, at the polls and not in the House of Commons, and that the Liberals, once in office, cannot by any legislative measure strengthen or confirm the cause which has brought them into power. Their success will practically amount to a national vote in favor of letting things alone, and the achievement of it will be all the assistance that Free Trade needs or indeed is capable of receiving. The Liberals will, therefore, find after forming their Government that, so far as they are concerned and for the time being, the question of Free Trade, which brought them union and power, is settled, or rather has settled itself, and that there is nothing to be done, no bills to be brought forward, no measures to be proposed, that can in any way clinch the all-sufficing verdict of the polls. While restored to office, therefore, as Free-Traders, Free Trade cannot in the nature of things engage much of their time and activities, and it is in quite other fields that they will have to make their mark as legislators and administrators. And it is just here, of course, that Mr. Chamberlain is looking for an outbreak of the old friction and the old dissensions. The real question that has to be asked about

the Liberal Party is this: Does the unity which has been effected by a common devotion to Free Trade extend to other issues and other policies, or are the Liberals, apart from this single question, just as fundamentally divided among themselves as ever?

To answer this question is exceedingly difficult. There are, however, certain rocks ahead of the Liberal vessel which may be specified. One of these is Lord Rosebery. Lord Rosebery is still, as he has been for years past, the puzzle of English politics. He is the one Liberal statesman of the day who has something of genius about him. He exercises over the imagination of the country a fascination which no mistakes seem wholly able to destroy. He makes speeches, he outlines policies, he emits explosive suggestions. There is an organization, the Liberal League, founded, if not in his interests, at least to popularize his views; and a certain number of Liberal M.P.'s, Mr. Haldane, Mr. Asquith, and Sir Edward Grey among them, undoubtedly look to him for leadership and advice. Yet I should hesitate to say that Lord Rosebery is either in politics or out of politics. Nobody knows, nobody even professes to know, whether he would be ready to take office in a Liberal Government. I do not believe that Lord Rosebery himself knows. He suffers from one of the most grievous defects that a politician can possess—he has no prejudices. He lacks, too, the gregarious instinct; he remains always an individual; his whole nature kicks against the pricks of party compulsion, against those compromises and small surrenders that make the party system possible; the party view is his view only when it precisely squares with his private judgment. No one was ever more surely smitten with the curse of dispassionateness. His intellectual honesty recoils from the extremes that a party demands; he sees both sides too clearly; all his mental instincts are at war with fanaticism, exaggeration or bias of whatever kind. Lord Rosebery is never so convinced of anything as to be able to drive from his mind whatever may be urged on the other side. He is incapable of being a thorough-going partisan; and this in politics is a handicap that nothing can quite overcome. There never has been, and there is never likely to be, a great political leader who was not on occasion a ferocious partisan. But Lord Rosebery cannot simplify himself to that extent. He cannot nail his colors to an inspiring prejudice or a stimulating half-truth; the consciousness that it is a prejudice, and not the whole truth, unnerves

him. Moreover, he lacks imperiousness. He can lead only when others are ready and even anxious to follow; he cannot coerce a mutinous or discontented group into accepting his *ipse dixit*. He hates, and probably despises, the personal and contentious side of politics and the small arts of managing men. It is doubtful whether he would raise a little finger to make himself Premier again. It is true that not very long ago he asked Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey to pledge themselves not to take office under Lord Spencer; but, when both refused, he did no more. The whole nature of the man impels him to give up to mankind what was meant for his party.

Yet Lord Rosebery is still a great influence. Neither the country nor the party expects or even wishes that he will be the Premier of the new Liberal Ministry, but there would be a feeling of universal satisfaction and relief if he could be prevailed upon to accept the Foreign Secretaryship. He stands and always has stood for that "sane" Imperialism which it was never more necessary to emphasize than at this moment. He alone can clear the Liberal Party of its evil reputation—whether rightly or wrongly earned, I will not now inquire—for anti-nationalism, "Little Englandism" and indifference to the Empire. No man has stood out more strongly for the continuity of Foreign and Imperial policy, and with the question of Lord Milner's position—which, however, may, and as some think and many hope will, be solved by the offer of his resignation—and of the Chinese Labor Ordinance staring the new Liberal Ministry in the face, there is need enough for the preservation of a uniform and consistent policy. A great many Liberals would like to recall Lord Milner and repeal the Ordinance. Wiser counsels, I believe, will ultimately prevail, but there is always the danger that a Liberal Ministry may get out of touch with the rational but firmly Imperial sentiment of the nation; and against this danger Lord Rosebery's presence in the Cabinet is the only assurance that would satisfy the country.

But there is another and even more hazardous problem on which Lord Rosebery has taken a line of his own. I refer, of course, to the Home Rule question and the relations between the Liberal and Nationalist parties. Not only has he wiped the Gladstonian form of Home Rule from his slate, but both he and Mr. Asquith have declared that they would not take office in any Liberal Govern-

ment that was tied down by contract to the Irish vote. That does not, of course, exclude cooperation with the Nationalists, but it does exclude any such alliance as bound the two parties together in 1892. Lord Rosebery's Irish policy, as it has been unfolded to me by his nearest and ablest lieutenant, is to wait on events, to determine how far the general situation has been changed by the workings of the Local Government Act and the Land Purchase Act, to extend and develop local self-government in Ireland as much as possible, to inquire into and wherever possible economize on the system of Dublin Castle rule, to encourage educational, industrial and agricultural development freely—in short, to advance step by step along the humble line of practical utility, and not waste time over "heroic" measures.

When this policy was first announced (towards the end of 1901), it was at once met by a declaration from Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman that Home Rule was still a part of *his* programme; but, unquestionably, it is the Rosebery rather than the Campbell-Bannerman policy that commands the assent of most Liberals in or out of the House of Commons. The only difficulty is, How far will it satisfy the Irish? It is at this point that the size of the Liberal majority at the next election becomes crucially important. If it is so small that the Government is dependent for its very existence upon the Irish vote, Mr. Chamberlain's anticipations of a speedy collapse may yet be fulfilled. A clear (but somewhat unlooked-for) plurality over the Nationalists and Protectionists combined is the only guarantee that the Liberals will be able to develop an Irish or any other policy with real freedom. Again, there is more than a little peril lurking in the Liberal determination to amend the Education Act of 1902. Not only the Nationalists but the revolted Unionist Free-Traders, most of whom are strong High Churchmen, would be against them there. Moreover, it must be remembered that the Nationalists, in their action upon the course of English politics, are entirely detached and concerned solely with Irish interests. They will strike a bargain with any leader and any party that will do most to further their views of Irish needs; and if, as the result of the next election, they find themselves holding the balance of power between the Protectionists and the Free-Traders, it is not by any means certain—especially when one recalls Mr. Chamberlain's character and the desperate exigencies of his position—that they will neces-

sarily throw in their lot with the Free-Traders. More attractive offers may quite conceivably be forthcoming from another quarter. The Liberal path, in default of an overwhelming majority, promises therefore to have its thorns and pitfalls, both personal and political. They have, however, plenty of young, able and energetic men to choose from; they have been ten years out of office, and may be presumed to have learned some of the lessons of adversity; the influence of those Unionists who for the sake of Free Trade have broken away from their own party will be of a restraining character; and the party as a whole is deeply conscious of the folly of an overloaded programme, heroic legislation and of committing itself hopelessly in advance. All this may help to pull them through.

BERLIN, *September, 1904.*

At a time when the Premier of England has been descanting mellifluously upon the utter inability of science to find "ultimate criteria," and again in despairing accents upon his own and everybody else's inability to discover any remedy whatsoever to check the physical deterioration of the British people, it is refreshing to turn to the buoyant optimism of the Proletarian Parliament-elect which has just concluded its labors at Amsterdam—where the predominant note is hope, the watchword "endeavor," and criteria of life and science are found and formulated in a morning's sitting. Unusual interest attached to the Congress—the sixth International Socialist Congress that has sat since the Commune—because it was the first time that the leaders of the Social Democracy had been summoned from all parts of the globe, including Japan, to sit in judgment upon party tactics, and party leaders, and the infallibility of Karl Marx. In plain words, the Congress had to pronounce for or against the Reformist or Revisionist movement; and, as was to be expected, it decided by a nationality vote of 25 to 5, with 12 abstentions, for the orthodox class revolutionary programme. That is to say, opportunist or parliamentary tactics were condemned. A vote of censure was passed on M. Jaurès; and the doctrinaire propagandist Socialism of Marx and of modern Germany, with its formula of "class war," its doctrine of revolution, and its principle of relentless opposition to capitalism and to all compromise with the *Bourgeoisie*, was triumphantly acclaimed by the Assembly.

Thus the International Tribunal has upheld the muzzling resolution passed last year at Dresden upon Bernstein, and subsequently by the Italians at Bologna. If it does not end a crisis, it forms an important landmark in it, and may mark a new era in the history of Socialism. It has shown that two Socialisms exist fundamentally incompatible the one with the other. For ideas cannot be confined; and, though dogma has defeated rationalism, theory practice, adolescence youth, it may legitimately be doubted whether the pragmatic decision of the party as an International whole will exercise any serious restraining influence, at any rate in republican France, upon the parliamentary tactics of Jaurès or upon the man himself. Nevertheless, the vote of the most representative and collective body of men ever assembled together under the banner of Socialism in favor of "class" warfare, is a noteworthy one. Among other things, it shows that not only is Socialism the most powerful numerically in the country of the greatest autocratic ruler in Europe, but that it is also the most strenuous, the most vital intellectually, there.

Though the first note of discord was sounded by Bernstein, then living in enforced exile in England, only six years ago, the so-called revisionist movement has advanced almost as rapidly as the central movement itself. Naturally, its chief adherents are to be found in the countries where parliamentary government has been most developed, where the conditions of life are easier, where the monarchical principle is less pronounced. Thus there is no "rational" Socialism in Russia, and, on the other hand, practically no "revolutionary" Socialism in Great Britain. But, quite apart from the academic side of the question, there is unmistakable evidence that the masses,—M. Zola's "*Salariats*"—are growing less and less prone to revolutionary methods, and more and more reconciled to the principle of evolution. The old fetishist belief in the monarchical idea is rapidly dying out among the peoples of all nations; and with it the popular faith in violence, the idea of revolution as the only means to obtain the Socialist goal. And, though it is true that the power of monarchs tends to grow stronger precisely in countries where constitutional government has been freely adopted, this tendency is undoubtedly due to the same cause. Indeed, the masses would appear to be growing "softer," witness the fiasco of the General Strike in Belgium a year or so ago. The idea of the Divinity of Kings of necessity en-

genders hatred and opposition, if only by contrast. When that idea has completely vanished, probably kings will sleep "the easier o' nights"; most certainly, one of the strongest incitements to revolution will have disappeared. But be that as it may, the last five years have wrought far-reaching changes in the minds of the people. The educational force of Socialism on the Continent has been prodigious. It has given the proletariat that great gift, freedom of thought. The sacrosanctity of majesty, of aristocracy, of class rule, of religion, are things he no longer believes in. The humblest neophyte to Socialism has learned to think of himself as a human being, with a will to live and think independently. He no longer fears God or man. But he has also become less able to suffer for either. And so, naturally enough, the doctrinaire Socialism of Marx, with its hard and fast dogmas and fatalistic teaching, has ceased to exercise the magic power of old. Some have begun to doubt, and many have seen that what is applicable in one country is not at all so in other countries where conditions and institutions are fundamentally different. Thus the reformist idea has grown and spread.

In the region of criticism, Bernstein has been engaged in probing, analyzing and dissecting Marxian Socialism; in exposing gray theories, in demolishing the Ikons of dogma, in tearing down the cherished idols of the "Blanquist" or ultra-revolutionary section. He has been four times solemnly impeached, and last year was very nearly ejected from the party. If he has no personal following, he has found partisans, independent supporters, men like Von Vollmar, Auer, David, Schippel (to mention only a few) who work in the same direction. But he is lacking in fibre as a man, is no orator, no leader of men. And, as a result, his work so far has been of an entirely negative character. Though there unquestionably exists a revisionist movement in Germany, there is no recognized leader, or programme, or party; and so the solidarity of the party remains unimpaired by Bernsteinism; and, so long as present conditions in the Empire obtain, neither Bernstein nor any other leader of the opportunist's section are at all likely to gain any marked influence. In France it has been otherwise. There criticism has been silent, but practical action all the more pronounced. A Socialist enters the Ministry, sits by the side of General de Gallifet, and bows low before the Tsar. Jaurès lunches with the King of Italy, and supports the Government

loyally at times in defiance of republican traditions; finally, he overtly counsels his party to accept office when attainable and cooperate with the *bourgeois* parties. In a word, Jaurès has become a sort of John Burns in his own country, and has completely broken with the principles and traditions of Continental Socialism, which is International and violently opposed to national continuity, Particularism, and Individualism in any form whatsoever. The example of the French reformists has been followed in Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, Austria, and naturally in England with more or less success; and there can be no doubt that, on the eve of the Amsterdam Congress, the issue was not so much whether Socialism was to abandon its revolutionary character and adopt evolutionary methods, but, rather, whether the independence of the Proletarian party, as a class, was to be upheld or abandoned in favor of alliance and fusion with the *Bourgeoisie*. This the International Council at Amsterdam has decreed against resolutely. Though this decision is by no means final, there is no gainsaying the fact that the reformist movement has been condemned: twice nationally, in Germany and Italy, and now internationally by the plenary Court at Amsterdam. Logically, the reformist movement, after five years of agitation, has thus proved a failure. The question, which time alone can solve, is: Will this be the case?

It is worth noting that the Congress dealt exclusively with the parliamentary tactics of Jaurès, and not at all with Bernstein, who, as before said, was virtually disabled at last year's Congress at Dresden. Nothing can better illustrate the solidarity, the intellectual power, of the movement than the mere fact, remarkable enough in these days of universal parliamentary decadence, that nearly 500 delegates, recruited for the most part from the lower classes—men of such varied hue and temperament as Frenchmen, Germans, Italians, Austrians, Spanish, English, and Japanese—should be able to meet together, discuss, and settle the most complex and conflicting problems affecting theory and practice, swiftly, decorously, and definitively, without a trace of personal or national recrimination. There was the intellectual Socialism of France pitted against the rude dogma of Germany; the incisive logic of Jaurès against the hurricane anathemas of the former wheelwright, Bebel. Germany triumphed; yet the President did not once have to intervene. Throughout the fierce oratorical duel

between the foremost speakers of France and Germany, who attacked one another with all the dialectical force and eloquence at their disposal, not one jarring note was struck. The two men sank into the two ideas they represented. It was an assembly dominated by ideas. It may be questioned whether the same could be said of any other International parliament of men living. Never before has Bebel had to face so formidable an adversary. "You think," said Jaurès, in one of the greatest speeches he ever delivered, "that the rules applying to Germany should necessarily apply to France and elsewhere, but, though you are a splendid propagandist party, you are none the less doomed to political incapacity. You lack the two means essential to action—the tradition of revolution and parliamentary force. You did not win your suffrage, as we did, on the barricades; and your vote in the Reichstag is powerless, because your Ministers are irresponsible and your Emperor is omnipotent. You cannot advance or make any proportionate use of your power. You screen your own weakness behind the veil of dogma, and you seek to condemn the Socialists of all other countries to inaction because you and your party are forced by the condition of things in your own country to momentary impotency. You do not understand parliamentary life as it exists in England, in France, and Belgium and Switzerland, because you are hidebound by your own institutions and have not the means to alter them." This is, of course, unanswerably true. But it is a negation of the "class war" formula, which is the cardinal thesis of Marxian Socialism, and unquestionably the key to its success. And Bebel could retort with justice that opportunist tactics, as practised in countries of an advanced democratic type, dulled the class spirit of hostility to Capital, which, as it is the main characteristic of modern times, will in the future be the decisive factor in the struggle for the emancipation of the working classes. The goal is economic, not political, though the means to that end lead largely through political channels. The question at issue between the Socialism of Bebel and that of Jaurès is not so much concerned with the means to the end as with the end itself. As Bernstein once wrote: "The end is nothing, the movement everything." And, from the purely Socialist point of view, it is a very moot point whether the action of the reformists in turning themselves into a radical parliamentary party may not result in their involuntary fusion in, and ab-

sorption by, the *Bourgeoisie*, whose interests—those of Capitalism—they will support, and whose dupes they will finally be. Can the Proletarian party ever hope to obtain its goal by adopting the methods, say, of the English Labor Representation Committee— independence with cooperation? And, if so, why is it that in England, which has a larger derelict population than any other country in Europe, pure Socialism can hardly be said to exist? It is because the “class” formula is tabooed as being incompatible with parliamentary tradition. It has been said that every country has the Socialists it deserves. Which is unquestionably true. But it should not be overlooked that Continental Socialism is international, and that the interests of the proletariat, as of capitalists, are the same all the world over. It may be that the ideas of Jaurès will prevail some day in central Europe, and that the laboring classes will obtain some of their legitimate wants by the legitimate means of self-help and legislation. But will they ever, by parliamentary representation, obtain a legitimate share in the profits of labor? That is the point which the reformists ignore, because the end with them has ceased to be the object of their attention. Eliminate “class war” from Marxian Socialism, and the whole edifice falls to the ground. It becomes a doctrine without a creed. On that formula Socialism, in its economic sense, must, it would seem, ultimately stand or fall.

Meanwhile the unity of Socialism has once more been declared. Whether it will endure seems highly doubtful. Probably the reformist movement will grow within and without the central movement until the moment arrives when further attempts at reconciliation and reunion will appear senseless and undignified. In that case there would be two quite distinct homogeneous Socialisms—the one representing the lower *Bourgeoisie*, the other, by far the most powerful, the class interests of the masses.

PARIS, September, 1904.

WHEN M. Waldeck-Rousseau, in 1900, first read his Bill on Association, which was soon to become a Bill on Religious Associations, he was probably more favorably disposed towards religion and the religious Orders than the Ministers of the *roi très chrétien*, Louis Philippe, who were so scared at the appearance of Lacordaire in the white robe of a Preaching Friar. He shared, of course, the

secular ideas about the mutual position of Church and State; he wanted the clergy to keep to their own sphere, and that sphere he probably took to be exclusively pastoral duties, for he publicly objected to clerical education. But, whereas he insisted on a radical separation between the two powers, he bore no ill-will to the free development of religious institutions within the Church: otherwise, he would not have admitted even the notion of a monastic order. His friends, several monks among the number, will have it that his real aim was to secure the existence of the Orders against the attacks in the future which everybody foresaw. So he was by no means opposed to the ideal of Christian life embodied in the monastic life. Only he was endeavoring to regulate the existing associations—the religious orders being uppermost in his thoughts—and he could not but consider their legal status. Of the fifteen hundred congregations settled on French territory, about one-half were legally authorized, *i. e.*, had obtained, on examination of their object and regulations, official recognition. The rest only enjoyed the toleration which their good works were certain to assure them. It was especially with these seven or eight hundred unauthorized orders that the new law was concerned.

What were M. Waldeck-Rousseau's intentions with regard to them? We know them with certitude. He had no sympathy with the Jesuits, and he felt an especial dislike against one particular Order, the Assumptionists, whom he once described as "trading, plotting monks." About these his mind was evidently made up. There was also a clause in the bill which its author must have known to be irreconcilable with the continuation of the more important Orders. The Benedictines, Franciscans, Dominicans, etc., are responsible only to the Pope and highly value their exemption from episcopal jurisdiction. Now, M. Waldeck-Rousseau wanted all Orders to be in future under the Bishops who should answer to the Government for their action. This condition, of course, made authorization an impossibility for those who could not renounce their privilege. In spite of this unfortunate circumstance, it seemed that the Bill was bringing the Orders, which the Concordat had ignored, under the protection which the Concordat gave to the Bishops and secular clergy, and M. Waldeck-Rousseau could say that he was really giving the monks and nuns their saving charter. For there was little doubt that the congregations that applied for authorization would easily get it, and they were

by no means degrading themselves by submitting to a measure which, excepting one accidental clause, was only the common law of the land. The exception in the bill to which I am alluding, in fact, betrayed a distrust of the Orders which was not in keeping with the rest of M. Waldeck-Rousseau's liberal dispositions. Whereas authorization could only be granted by an act of Parliament, after a debate in the Chamber or Senate, the same could be repealed by a decree of the Council of Ministers; that is to say, it took the consent of the country as represented by Parliament to give legal existence to a religious association, but an arbitrary act of the Government was enough to suppress it. This was certainly not democratic. However, broadly speaking and paying special attention to its initiator's intentions, the act of 1901 might be said to proceed from a spirit nearly akin to that in which Napoleon had framed the Concordat: it was a homage to religion and, at the same time, a barrier against clericalism.

So, at the end of 1901, the views of the Government in connection with Catholicism were, on the whole, hardly different from those which prevailed in the days when the sovereign could be on his guard against episcopal influence, without disbelieving a syllable in the Bishops' teaching. In May of the following year, the general election took place. M. Waldeck-Rousseau resigned, and M. Combes came into office. This event brought about a complete change in ecclesiastical policy. M. Waldeck-Rousseau was not a statesman of the first order, but he had a comprehensive intellect, wide political experience, and the tinge of scepticism which people occasionally noticed in him served at least to differentiate him from the partisan. M. Combes was known as a doctrinaire, a man who had started with the narrowest Catholic philosophy and had reached the other extreme without ever enlarging his speculative outlook. He was well acquainted with educational and naval questions, but he had hardly had any experience of government, having been Minister of Education only for a few months; and one had reason to suspect he would treat politics as a purely speculative matter. This forecast proved true, in so far as the Premier never swerved from the line he had drawn for himself, viz., fierce anti-clericalism to the exclusion of everything else; but M. Combes surprised both friends and enemies by an adroitness in difficult emergencies which nobody expected from him. He seems to have viewed his rôle not as that of the re-

sponsible statesman, who has a policy of his own and fights to make it prevail, but as that of the subordinate who sticks to his orders and, by hook or by crook, by violence or by dexterity, carries them out. It was M. Waldeck-Rousseau's bitterest sorrow in his dying months to see the law he designed as an instrument of justice become one of narrow partisanship.

The reader remembers how the Association Law was applied; one should rather say how it never was applied. Each demand for authorization was to be separately examined by the Chamber or Senate. M. Combes decided that all the applications should be thrown into three divisions, and *not* examined separately but accepted or rejected bodily. The ballot on this interpretation showed a decrease of the ministerial majority to sixteen votes instead of about seventy, and elicited a public protest from M. Waldeck-Rousseau: but the congregations were none the less dispersed and their property confiscated. For this confiscation no satisfactory reason was ever given. On the contrary, the ingrafted hostility against all Orders, charitable as well as contemplative, evidenced in the vote, found hundreds of apologists in Parliament and in the press. These men have turned with equal success two opposite theories against the congregations; and the evolution from one to the other accounts for much we see and anticipates a great deal of what is to come.

Under the *ancien régime*, the doctrine of Divine Right made the King's will absolute and final. Against this absolutism popular feeling rebelled for centuries, till it was eventually blown away at the Revolution. Then for the Rights of the King were substituted the Rights of Man. The foundation of this famous declaration—still placarded in every school and town hall of France—lies in Rousseau's dogma of man's natural goodness and his claim to complete liberty in order to develop his faculties. This means individualism, or, as it is called, Liberalism. Man is entitled to as much freedom as will not be hurtful to his neighbor. This notion, at first sight, seems to favor a toleration of monasticism, as a man may apparently be a monk if he pleases. Not so, argue the champions of the Rights of Man: nobody ought to be suffered to renounce his own personality by taking the vows of poverty, obedience and chastity. The conclusion was that M. Combes had been a champion of liberty and a redeemer of slaves in refusing authorization to the monks who applied for it. Another corollary

was that his duty was, moreover, to revoke the authorization from the Orders which were in enjoyment of it. The principle—strictly a jurist's principle—of the Act of 1901 was against this further step, but the Premier ought not to forget that the Act contained a clause empowering the Cabinet to withdraw authorization when they chose; and, besides, M. Combes was already persuaded that another Bill could easily be introduced to amend the Act. In March of the present year, a bill was read depriving the authorized teaching Orders of their legal existence. It was passed in July, and the process of expulsion was immediately resumed.

As the "arraignment of immorality" can be hurled against the charitable and contemplative congregations, just as well as against those employed in education, we can look upon monasticism as virtually a thing of the past in France.

Monasticism being condemned in the name of Liberalism, is the religious question at last settled? It appears that it is only opened. Besides the regular or conventual, there are the secular or parochial, clergy, on the legal position of whom another philosophy is brought to bear. We are only entering upon another stage of the anti-clerical campaign. Liberalism and the Rights of Man were scarcely mentioned during the debate on the teaching Orders to which I referred above. Another doctrine, widely different, is now taken for granted. For some years we have been treated in the special reviews to discussions of the disastrous economical consequences of Liberalism. From those periodicals the mistrust spread to metaphysical and political magazines. It has been asserted that the individual has no rights, as he lives in society, is part and parcel of society, and can only speculatively be said to be an individual at all. Society alone has rights and communicates them to its members, as it thinks advisable. A Toulouse professor, M. Bouglé, has upheld this doctrine in a book which M. Faguet, the French academician, refutes in his volume on Liberalism. As may be imagined, there is a good deal of hair-splitting in those very speculative pages, as the duties of society eventually prove to be very much the same thing as the ousted rights of the individual. But hair-splitting would be poor work in a Parliament, and the French deputies rest satisfied with the new formula that nobody has any rights but society, or, as they very inaccurately interpret it, the State. The reason for depriving the congregations of the right of teaching was not only that their vows

rendered them immoral and dangerous to youth, but chiefly that the right of teaching is invested in the State, is no natural claim of the individual citizen, and can be conceded or revoked at pleasure.

But if this be admitted, M. Jaurès and M. Buisson urged, why not withdraw the permission of teaching from the secular clergy, who conduct about half of our secondary schools? Their reasoning is cogent, and although the law of 1852 on the liberty of teaching had been confirmed by the Senate in the spring of this year, M. Combes only postponed not an answer but the fulfilment of his promise, till after the separation of Church and State. The tendency to secularize the school and the hospital, and to confine Christianity to its place of worship, is therefore visible.

What is the situation of the Church to be when she is thus restricted to her primary object? If the Concordat were not on the eve of disappearing, we should only have to say that the Church would be in exactly the same position as in 1802, when there were no religious Orders, no clerical schools, and when the clergy, weakened and thinned by ten years' persecution, had enough to do to serve the parochial churches. She would be in regular intercourse with Rome through a Nuncio and Bishops appointed by the Pope on the one hand, supported and, to a certain extent, controlled by the State on the other. But disestablishment is no longer a castle in the air. To-day, the recall of the French Ambassador from Rome and of the Nuncio from Paris necessitates a radical solution. The Church must be before many months separated from the State, and the question now is: What is the situation to be after that separation?

In America, where individualism and Liberalism are living facts and not subject-matter for metaphysicians, the average reader understands the term "Catholic Church" as standing for the collectivity of Roman Catholics, flock as well as Bishops. Catholicism appears as a doctrine and a way of life which a man chooses for himself, and follows. In France the term only means the governing body, *i. e.*, the Bishops and priests. It is never used in the Chamber in another sense. The citizen as a believer never occurs to the parliamentary mind. It is just the reverse in England when the legislator thinks of the Wesleyans or Presbyterians: he knows he deals rather with individuals than with a community. The French notion results from the religious indifference of most members of the Parliament, the faithful mirror in this of most of

the electorate, and also from the recollections of a time when the Church was one of the Three States and the greatest power in the country. Its first consequence is that the Church is regarded, even by moderate Republicans, as a weakened but still dangerous influence. Napoleon, who thought the clergy indispensable allies of his restorative policy, never viewed them as citizens in the full enjoyment of their rights (the liberal concept), but as *fonctionnaires* whom he chose, paid and made use of.

Of the deputies who will soon decide on a new legal status for the Church of France, at least a third—most of M. Méline's former party—hold the same Gallican opinions. Liberals though they be, an inveterate habit will cause them still to look upon the Church as a more or less necessary State institution. The denunciation of the Concordat means for them forty million francs saved yearly, not the liberty of the citizens who henceforward will have to find the money. They have never found fault with the restrictive clauses in the Concordat (those, for instance, prohibiting a Bishop from travelling outside his diocese to visit a brother or even the Pope, or forbidding the publication of a papal document without special permission); and they would be disturbed if the clergy were suddenly given the liberty of, say, a vast commercial association. In their hearts French legislators always lean towards the absolute sovereignty of the State. So, at best, the future position of the Church would not be very different from what it has been so far. But the moderate deputies whose tendencies I am describing are only a section of the Chamber, and most of them in the minority. The Radicals call them "reactionaries" and "Jesuits in disguise," and the Radicals will eventually pass the Disestablishment Act in the form they please. Now—judging by the most intelligent and fairest, though the most violent, of them, M. Clémenceau—they will do their utmost to keep the clergy in its present dependence on the State, and at the same time to isolate them from the Pope, whom they insist on calling—I am only quoting polite language—"a foreign monarch." It cannot be doubted that they would gladly welcome a national or schismatic church. It cannot be doubted either that the present Government cherishes the same hope. By taking the side of the two Bishops whom the Pope wanted to try for alleged misconduct, M. Combes removed all doubt of his real intentions. Therefore we must expect some anti-Roman paragraphs in the Act. They do not appear

in the bill as drawn up by M. Briand, but they are very likely to be inserted in the course of the debate, and the Radicals will evidently maintain that the "foreign monarch," whose utterances could not be made public in France when he had an ambassador there, will have less title than ever to speak authoritatively. I wish I had more space in which to give some idea of the bill. Its trend will be plainly seen when I say that the clergy will not even be allowed to buy their churches back, nor to rent them for a longer tenure than five years, nor to own other property than stock, and no more capital than will be necessary for their expenditure; finally, they will not be at liberty to say what they please in their churches, and a scale of fines is provided for language that may be deemed offensive. We are far from M. Waldeck-Rousseau's ideal.

Yet the Socialistic friends of the Premier would like something more, and we must own they are true to logic. Their charge of immorality falls as well on the seculars—since they take the vow of perpetual celibacy—as on the Regulars. Their primary doctrine, that earth must become an Eden, is also contradicted by the Christian dogma of suffering and probation here below to secure happiness in the hereafter. In truth, they simply long for a revolution in the discipline and teaching of the Church, and as they doubt its possibility, they would gladly revert to the sweeping methods of their ancestors, the Revolutionists, and have done with Christianity altogether. We remember their outcry when M. Combes once asserted his belief in the spirituality of the soul, and we have not forgotten M. Jaurès's fierce attack against the Gospel, which, he says, contains implicitly even the Syllabus. Their aim is, after getting rid of the monastic orders, the clerical schools, the Concordat and Roman influence, to get rid, at last, of all Christian teaching and worship. To this extremity the logic of anti-clericalism pushes them.

Will M. Combes follow the Socialists so far, or will they be content with the suppression of the Concordat and the establishment of as national a church as possible? If they should insist on the more radical measures, M. Combes would be doomed at once. But they have learned to be content with a little when they cannot get much, and they will probably put up with an enslaved church till they see their way to "no church at all." In spite of the undisguised hostility of such formidable rivals as MM. Mille-

rand and Doumer, I shall not be greatly surprised if the Premier finds himself safe on the other side of the worst difficulty he ever encountered. But it will be his last success. For the incline down which he rolls brings him to a turning-point where the Socialists will place him face to face with economical reforms impossible to a *bourgeois*, and then we shall see either a reaction with M. Doumer or M. Rouvier, or a revolution with M. Jaurès.

WASHINGTON, September, 1904.

SINCE the adoption of the gold standard in the United States was definitely settled in 1900 by a second pronouncement at the ballot-box, no American question has deserved so much attention on the part of thoughtful men in European capitals as the question whether President Roosevelt or Judge Parker will occupy the White House during the four years beginning March 4, 1905. The question includes three inquiries, none of which can be answered until the decision of the voters shall be known. Is the Dingley tariff to be maintained substantially intact during the next Presidential term, or is it to undergo material alterations through revision and reciprocity? Will the American people proclaim a fixed determination to retain possession permanently of the Philippines, or will they announce a purpose of treating them as Cuba has been treated, and, consequently, of giving them absolute independence at an early date? A renunciation of the islands would involve, we scarcely need to say, the removal of the United States from the list of Powers deeply interested in the future of China. In the third place, will the Monroe Doctrine receive during the coming quadrennium the construction and expansion which Mr. Roosevelt has given it by deed and word, or will it be applied on the narrower lines approved by a series of Democratic Presidents from the original propounder of the doctrine to the author of the Venezuela Message. A good deal of light is cast on these inquiries by the acts and declarations of Mr. Roosevelt's Administration, by his speech of acceptance and his letter of acceptance, and by the platform framed for the Republican party at Chicago. From the opposite political quarter some illumination is shed by the platform put forward by the Democratic National Convention, and by its nominee's speech of

acceptance, which presently will be supplemented by a letter of acceptance, not published at the hour when we write. With all of these data before them, foreign observers should be able to judge what the outcome of our approaching general election will signify from the view-point of world-politics.

Great Britain, Germany and France, our principal competitors in the export of manufactured articles, are particularly concerned with the effect which the coming election may have upon our tariff. It is a mistake to assume that the triumph of Judge Parker at the ballot-box would have no fiscal consequences, owing to the fact that his Republican opponents are practically certain to command a majority in the Federal Senate during the next four years. Political history warrants the belief that, if the popular verdict should be in Judge Parker's favor, the revisionists within the ranks of the Republican party itself, who have been temporarily silenced, would make themselves heard in Massachusetts, on the one hand, and in Iowa and other Western States, on the other, and would call in such peremptory tones for changes in the free list and in certain schedules of the Dingley tariff, that a sufficient number of their Senators, though ostensibly Republican, might feel constrained to vote with their Democratic colleagues, and thus secure the enactment of the desired measure. It is quite conceivable that peremptory instructions to that end might be given by the Legislatures of Iowa, Wisconsin, Michigan and Massachusetts. Much the same thing may be said of reciprocity, should the Democrats be successful at the polls. In that event, the General Court, as the Legislature of Massachusetts is termed, would be almost certain to order its representatives in the Federal Senate to vote for a reciprocity treaty with Canada, and her example would be likely to be followed in some other States. If Mr. Roosevelt, on the other hand, should be chosen Chief Magistrate, no early and drastic revision of the Dingley tariff need be looked for, and the conclusion of a reciprocity treaty with any foreign country is exceedingly improbable. We are, practically, debarred from making any agreement of the kind with *sugar-producing* countries, because the dominant element in the Republican party loaded the Cuban reciprocity treaty with a stipulation that the Dingley tariff should remain intact as regards all other purveyors of sugar. A reciprocity treaty with Canada or with Newfoundland would not, on that score, be impracticable,

but would be strenuously resisted on other grounds by the high-protectionists, who proved at Chicago that they control the Republican party. Great Britain has a special reason for viewing with anxiety the bearing which our Presidential election may have on the prospects of reciprocity treaties with Canada and Newfoundland. The conclusion of such treaties would tend to cause the inhabitants of those self-governing colonies to repel the overture made in the preferential tariff urged by Mr. Chamberlain.

Not only China and Japan, but Russia, Great Britain, Germany and France are manifestly concerned to know whether the Philippines are to remain permanently in American hands. If the United States are to continue for an indefinite period to be a Far-Eastern Power, we cannot well escape entanglement in the affairs of neighboring countries, and our fleets and armies are likely to be so increased as to become potential factors in the settlement of controversies affecting the Pacific coast of Asia. If, on the other hand, we should decide to evacuate the Philippine Archipelago, we should no longer feel called upon to maintain a naval or military force in the Pacific, except so far as a few warships might from time to time be needed to enforce observance of our commercial treaties. In England and Japan, our retirement from that quarter of the globe would be witnessed with regret; while it might be viewed with satisfaction in Russia, Germany and France, which recognize the sincerity of our desire to uphold the territorial integrity and political stability of China.

Foreign observers who would like to forecast the effect of our forthcoming election on our Philippine policy, may do well to note the material change which has taken place in the attitude of both our chief political parties toward this question since 1900. A Washington correspondent of the New York "Evening Post" has pertinently recalled that, four years ago, the chief Republican argument for the retention of the Philippines was that every vote cast for Bryan would be interpreted by the insurrectionists in the archipelago as a vote of sympathy, and that, hence, to uphold American sovereignty and American dignity, to say nothing of relieving American soldiers from unnecessary danger, it was indispensable to support the Republican ticket. No such claim now can be or is put forward by the Republicans, because no insurrectionists exist. The principal issue as regards the Philippines seems to be over a declaration of purpose as to the future of

the islands. The Republican platform draws attention to the fact that the Filipinos have already received an instalment of self-government, and promises that a larger and larger measure of home rule shall be accorded to them, in proportion as they show themselves qualified to profit by it. It is tacitly assumed, however, that our Federal Government is to be the sole judge of the approach of the islanders to fitness to care for their own affairs. It is also to be borne in mind that the Republican platform refrains from intimating that, at any time or under any circumstances, absolute independence will be granted to the Philippines. The Democratic platform, on the other hand, as interpreted and supplemented by a subsequent utterance of Judge Parker's, does make such a promise; and it is a fair inference from the known sincerity of the Democratic nominee that, if successful at the ballot-box, he would make an earnest effort to carry the promise out. Whether he would succeed in doing so is doubtful, for the reason that, not only his fellow Democrats, but their Republican opponents are divided on the question.

The same correspondent of the "Evening Post," whom we have previously mentioned, points out that it is impossible to reconcile the expressed views of ex-Secretary of War Root, of the present Secretary of War Taft, of President Roosevelt and of others who have some intimate acquaintance with the problem, on the one hand, and the bold declarations, on the other, of certain Western Republican Conventions in support of the permanent retention of the Philippines at all hazards. It is doubtful whether the employers of the phrase "at all hazards" are alive to the gravity of the economic issues that the retention of the islands may involve. There is no doubt that many Republicans, as well as almost all Democrats, will eventually ask why the United States should contribute out of their Federal Treasury for all sorts of services in the Philippine Islands and Porto Rico, when those countries pay no revenue to the United States. The Philippine scouts, which are displacing the United States army in the Philippines, are paid out of War Department appropriations. The Philippine Census has been almost wholly paid for by the United States. Various services are maintained on a half-and-half basis, our Federal Treasury contributing a moiety of the cost. How long will our taxpayers consent to do this, in view of the fact that the Philippines pay nothing to our national exchequer. Of course, they

could be made to pay something by including them in our tariff system, as we should be at liberty to do after the expiration of the ten-year period stipulated in the Treaty of Paris. It is extremely improbable, however, that either political party would deliberately advocate the "closed door" in the Philippines, for this would involve a repudiation of our persistent declarations with regard to China. Then, again, our taxpayers are likely to ask whether it is worth while to go on increasing our navy for the purpose, largely, of protecting an archipelago which is a drain upon our financial resources. The Republican Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives was credited some months ago with an estimate, which must be deemed conservative, that a naval establishment two-thirds as great as it now is would suffice to defend the United States, if we should get rid of the Philippines. These economical arguments against the retention of the islands may be recognized as potent, even in times of peace. They are reinforced by the forecast of the tremendous sacrifices that we might have to make in order to protect the islands, should a determination to conquer them be evinced by Japan, or by some other Power with naval stations in the Far East.

We pass to the third inquiry of interest to the outside world, the inquiry, namely, how our application of the Monroe Doctrine may be affected by the outcome of our general election. The view of the doctrine which would be taken by Judge Parker may easily be defined, for it would differ not a whit from that exemplified in Mr. Cleveland's second Administration. That is to say, a Democratic President would not permit a European Power to acquire territory belonging to a Latin-American Republic on the plea of readjusting boundaries, or on any other pretext whatever. On the other hand, he would not interpose to shield a Latin-American Republic from the attempt of a European Power to exact reparation for an insult to its flag, or for injury to its official representatives, or for an act of violence committed against the person or property of a subject or citizen; provided the reparation exacted did not take the form of territorial dismemberment, or of such permanent or prolonged crippling of the wrong-doer's financial resources as practically would, in Monroe's words, "control her destiny." It is equally certain that a Democratic President would draw a sharp distinction between wrongs or *torts*, on the one hand, and debts arising out of contract, on the other, to

which latter class of obligations he would probably hold the maxim "*caveat emptor*" applicable. He certainly would not countenance an attempt to enforce by a blockade, or by a protracted occupation of custom-houses, the virtual confiscation of an American republic's revenues, merely because default had been made in the payment of the principal or interest of a debt, the outcome of a transaction into which the foreign creditor entered with his eyes wide open. Much less would he *coöperate* in an effort thus to compel the liquidation of a civil indebtedness, or himself play the part of debt-collector in the interest of a foreign creditor. Yet such an extraordinary expansion, not to say distortion, of the doctrine formulated by Monroe seems to be deliberately contemplated by President Roosevelt, if we may judge from the ominous statement made by him in a letter read at the "Cuban Dinner." In that letter he said that, if a nation acts with decency in *industrial* and political matters, if it keeps order and *pays its obligations*, then *it need fear no interference from the United States*. The obvious inference is that, if a Latin-American Republic should *not* act with decency in industrial matters, and pay its obligations, then it would have cause to dread interference from the United States, which, as the President seems to assume, would arrogate the right of defining what constitutes decency and obligations. Mr. Roosevelt has also said, with reference to the Latin-American republics, that whoever claims liberty as a right must accept the responsibilities that go with the exercise of the right. Is the payment of debts arising out of contract one of the responsibilities which, if undischarged, would justify a President of the United States in permitting the delinquent commonwealth to pass into the hands of a receiver, or, in other words, to undergo the fate of Egypt? It seems incredible that Mr. Roosevelt can have weighed the significance of his words. But there they stand; and, if they mean anything, they mean that Mr. Roosevelt, if he continues in the White House, would either permit a foreign creditor, like Germany, for example, to Egyptianize a debtor-State in Latin America, or that, on the creditor's behalf, he would himself undertake the Egyptianizing process. The suggestion that an American Chief Magistrate should make himself a sheriff, and receive for European creditors at the expense of the political or financial independence of an American republic, would have sent a shiver of horror through the late James Monroe.